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Abstract: 
Due to negative consequences of climate change for agriculture and food production shocks affecting 
different areas of the world, the past two decades saw the conditions of global food security 
increasingly worsen. This has resulted in negative consequences for the world economy, partly causing 
international food price spikes and social upheavals. In this paper we present statistical findings along 
with a preliminary version of an original agent-based model called the Dawe Global Security Model 
that simulates the global food market and the political fragility of countries.The model simulates the 
effects of food insecurity on international food prices and how these, coupled with national political 
fragility and international food trade can, in turn, increase the probability of food riots in countries. The 
agents in the model are the 213 countries of the world whose characteristics reflect empirical data and 
the international trade of food is also simulated based on real trade partnerships and data. The model 
has been informed, calibrated and validated using real data and the results of these procedures are 
presented in the paper. To further test the model we also present the model’s forecasts for the near 
future in terms of food prices and incidence of food riots. The Dawe Global Security Model can be 
used to test scenarios on the evolution of shocks to global food production and analyse consequences 
for food riots. Further developments of the model can include national responses to food crises to 
investigate how countries can influence the spread of global food crises. 
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1. Introduction 
Food security, here defined as the global availability of food capable of meeting global food demand, 
has become one of the main priorities of the international political agenda following the 2008 global 
food crisis, which exposed the fragilities of the current structure of the international food system and 
which had severe consequences for poverty and conflict around the world. The 2008 global food crisis 
is indeed a clear example of how localised food production shocks can travel through networks and 
have important consequences for the global economy, which can generate reinforcing feedbacks that 
result in widespread political fragility and, in particular, food riots. This crisis was part of a globalised, 
multi-system crisis recently called ‘Synchronous Failure’ (Homer-Dixon, et al., 2015), and is a new 
type of crisis which involves failures within different parts of the Socio-Ecological System, which 
synchronise and can cause social unrest and fragility.  
 
The interconnectedness of the global food system through international trade entails both positive and 
negative consequences for global food security. Positive in terms of providing food supplies to 
countries that cannot grow enough food to feed their own populations, and negative in terms of the 
possibility of shocks to propagate through the global food supply chain, causing disruptions in different 
countries. On this last point, Puma, et al. (2015) and the report by Bailey, et al. (2015) found that the 
high interconnectivity of the global food system makes it vulnerable to self-propagating disruptions in 
case of a climate-related extreme event and that interconnectivity on the trade network is growing, with 
countries increasingly relying on food imported from a few large producer-exporters. 
 
Studies on global food security usually focus on solutions to provide a future balance between 
consumption and supply of food (Rosegrant and Cline, 2003; Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007; 
Godfray, et al., 2010; Anderson, 2010; Calzadilla, et al., 2011), which is a reductionist perspective of 
food security. A comprehensive account of how shocks to global production of food propagate through 
the international food system to give life to political instability and food riots is missing. Puma, et al. 
(2015) are the first to attempt to evaluate the resilience of the global food system, although their 
research only implemented a global network analysis and did not explore the consequences of food 
insecurity in terms of national political fragility and food riots. Raleigh, et al. (2015) went further by 
assessing and modelling the feedbacks between conflict, food prices and climate change, but their 
research only focussed on African countries, and hence their findings cannot be generalised. 
 
Future projections on climate change that are expected to worsen global food insecurity (Rosegrant and 
Cline, 2003; Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007; Maxwell, et al., 2010; Godfray, et al., 2010; Huang, et 
al., 2011; Berazneva and Lee, 2013; Wheeler and von Braun, 2013), alongside more common 
international food price spikes (Berazneva and Lee, 2013) and more frequent food riots (Smith, 2014) 
make these interactions worth exploring with a systemic approach to test the consequences of what-if 
scenarios and possible policy interventions. Puma, et al. (2015) call for further research in the 
dynamics of the system and possibly in systemic risk, as do other authors (Schweitzer, et al., 2009; 
Wheeler and von Braun, 2013; Raleigh, et al., 2015). In fact, quantitative research in the global food 
security field is scarce and the authors that have used a quantitative approach mainly implemented 
econometric techniques (e.g. Berazneva and Lee, 2013 or Raleigh, et al., 2015), which lack the 
possibility of introducing and evaluating the effects of feedbacks between food security, the 
international economy and the occurrence of food riots. 
 
One effective methodology that can start to disentangle the several relationships that characterise the 
complexity of the global food system is computer simulation. Only specific sectors and dynamics of 
the food system have been modelled in the past. Research particularly focussed on technology 
diffusion (e.g. Purvis, et al., 1995), land-use change (e.g. Loibl and Toetzer, 2003), impacts of climate 
change (e.g. Naylor, et al., 2007), policy analysis and testing (e.g. Waddell, 2000), consequences of 
changes in crop yield (e.g. Coble, et al., 2000) and the dynamics of the agricultural system more in 
general (e.g. Pasqualino, et al., 2015).  
 
Several modelling approaches are available. We chose Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) as it allows 
reproduction of the details of the complex dynamics characterising socio-ecological systems better than 
existing alternatives (Gilbert and Terna, 2000; Gilbert, 2008; Thiele, et al., 2011; Railsback and 
Grimm, 2012; Filatova, et al., 2013). ABM has been used in the agricultural sector to model 
technology diffusion (e.g. Berger, 2001), micro-scale market dynamics (e.g. Arsenault, et al., 2012), 
scenario and policy testing (e.g. Bastardie, et al., 2010), land use change (e.g. Zhang, et al., 2013), 
decision-making (e.g. Ng, et al., 2011) and land price dynamics (e.g. Filatova, et al., 2009). A systemic 
view of how food production shocks can translate into an increased probability of the occurrence of 
food riots in the world is missing from current literature, which is the gap that is addressed by this 
paper. 
 
The novelty of this research lies in the systemic approach adopted and in the development of a tool that 
can be of future use to test the consequences of food production shocks in terms of social unrest. In this 
paper we present the update of a quantitative analysis on some of the drivers of food riots previously 
published in Natalini, et al. (2015) and the structure of a novel ABM called the Dawe Global Security 
Model (DGSM), its calibration with the recent global food crisis, validation and future forecasts. The 
main aim of the DGSM is to model the dynamics that lead from international food security to the 
occurrence of food riots. This model represents a first attempt to simulate the complex dynamics that 
lead from global production shocks to the occurrence of food riots. In particular, the purpose of the 
model is to simulate how scarcity of food, its international price and national political fragility 
influence the probability of food riots in countries, also accounting for international food trade. The 
ultimate aim of the DGSM is to analyse the possible impacts of climate-related food production shocks 
and how these reverberate through the system, particularly focussing on the occurrence of food riots in 
countries. Although the ABM is still at a preliminary stage of development, its validation has led to 
promising results and we present forecasts for the year 2017. To model the relationship between the 
international price of food, national political fragility and food riots we extensively drew on the results 
from Natalini, et al. (2015) updating their results by extending their research both in time and 
geographically,  
 In the next section of this paper we present the current literature on the topics discussed in this paper. 
Section 3 will introduce the updated analysis on the relationship between food prices, fragility and food 
riots based on Natalini, et al. (2015). The fourth section will present the ABM and how the previous 
section analysis has been incorporated in the model. Section 5 will present the 2017 forecast and finally 
we will present our conclusions in Section 6. 
 
2. Food insecurity and food riots 
The global food system is a complex system of interrelated sectors such as physical (e.g. production of 
food), social (e.g. consumption of food), economic (e.g. price of food) and political (e.g. policies for 
food system). Changes in one sector can potentially have severe consequences for one or more of the 
others. A growing body of research has been dedicated to the study of these complex interactions and 
evidenced the existence of a vicious cycle between conflict, high international prices of food and food 
insecurity (Devereux and Maxwell, 2001; Auyero and Moran, 2007; Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011; 
Raleigh, et al., 2015). 
 
The main drivers of food insecurity are long-term social trends such as an increasing global population, 
environmental and climatic changes and international conflict (Godfray, et al., 2010; Brinkman and 
Hendrix, 2011; Calzadilla, et al., 2011; Berazneva and Lee, 2013; Puma, et al., 2015), which are 
expected to increase in the future hence worsening the conditions of global food insecurity. 
 
Previous literature explored the possible consequences of food (in)security, particularly highlighting a 
positive relationship between global scarcity of food and increases in international food prices 
(Godfray, et al., 2010; Raleigh, et al., 2015; Puma, et al., 2015), but also between global scarcity of 
food and increased probability of conflict (Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011; Raleigh, et al., 2015). Other 
authors also argued that food insecurity increases the chances of democratic breakdown in politically 
fragile countries (Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011).  
 
At the same time, high international food prices can impact food security (Brinkman and Hendrix, 
2011; Berazneva and Lee, 2013; Hendrix and Brinkman, 2013; Bellemare, 2014; Smith, 2014; Raleigh, 
et al., 2015) and the political stability of countries (Seddon and Walton, 1994; Arezki and Bruckner, 
2011; Bates, 2011; Berazneva and Lee, 2013), also causing political changes at the national level 
(Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011).  
 
The vicious cycle between food insecurity, international prices and unrest depicted above was clearly 
evident during the most recent wave of food riots. These events may have initially been motivated by 
issues around lack of access to food, which then transformed into a generalised dissent and discontent 
with the current establishment (O’Brien, 2012). Indeed, food riots are widely believed to negatively 
affect the political stability of countries (Crawley, et al., 2012) and that the political instability and 
unrest created can spread to neighbouring countries (Lagi, et al., 2011) and through networks (Puma, et 
al., 2015). Goldstone (2011), for instance, argued that these events can trigger larger grievances such as 
civil wars, as in the case for the French Revolution and the Arab Spring.  
 
Food riots have been defined as “violent, collective unrest leading to a loss of control, bodily harm or 
damage to property, essentially motivated by a lack of food availability, accessibility or affordability, 
as reported by the international and local media, and which may include other underlying causes of 
discontent” (Cuesta, 2014). Although the 2008 global food crisis triggered increased research on the 
interconnections between scarcity of food, international food prices and food riots, violent uprisings 
related to the price of food or scarcity thereof had been occurring for the past four centuries (Brinkman 
and Hendrix, 2011; Berazneva and Lee, 2013; Smith, 2014; Demarest, 2014).  
 
Since 2008 research has thus been focussing on the drivers of food riots, which notably are food 
insecurity (Lagi, et al., 2011; Crawley, et al., 2012) and high international food prices (Hendrix, et al., 
2009; Lagi, et al., 2011; Gaub, 2012; Crawley, et al., 2012; Bellemare, 2014; Smith, 2014; Bleischwitz, 
et al., 2014; Natalini, et al., 2015). However, the literature about the most recent (21st century) food 
riots found that food insecurity and high international food prices are neither a sufficient or necessary 
conditions for food-related unrest to happen. Indeed, some authors argued that international prices for 
food rarely translate perfectly into national prices for the same commodities (Brinkman and Hendrix, 
2011; Smith, 2014; Raleigh, et al., 2015), although Smith (2014) still found a positive relationship 
between a sudden increase in domestic food prices and urban unrest. Several authors argue that 
countries are more likely to experience food riots where there are food production shocks (e.g. King, et 
al., 2015) or if a country is a net food importer (e.g. Lagi, et al., 2011). However, these arguments are 
challenged by part of the literature. For instance, Buhaug, et al. (2015) found no evidence of a link 
between reduced agricultural output and an increase in the incidence of food riots in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Similarly, Natalini, et al. (2015) did not find a positive relationship between national food 
scarcity and the occurrence of food riots. This opinion is shared by other authors who believe that 
scarcity of food is not a direct cause of food riots, but rather a catalyst (e.g. Sneyd, et al., 2013). 
Finally, several authors found that food riots are more likely to occur in countries that are already 
politically fragile (Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011; Natalini, et al., 2015).  
 
The research on the drivers of food riots is comprehensive, but findings are contradictory and the 
methodologies implemented were not always appropriate. For instance, Lagi, et al. (2011) identified a 
threshold on the price of food as captured by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Food Price 
Index (FAO FPI) over which food riots are more likely to occur. This was set at 210 for the nominal 
version of the index. However, as highlighted by Natalini, et al. (2015) the database of food riots used 
by Lagi, et al. (2011) was inaccurate and the quantitative tests implemented inappropriate. In addition, 
the paper was never published in an academic peer-reviewed journal. Bellemare (2014) investigated 
both food price increases and food price volatility as possible causes of food riots. His results show no 
significant connection between food price volatility and the occurrence of food riots, whereas food 
price increases significantly affect this type of event, also providing causal evidence between the first 
two dynamics. However, an in-depth review of the article raised concerns on the author’s database on 
food riots, in particular, this could not be reproduced as it was collected through newspaper search 
engines that require an academic subscription, and, in addition, these databases add and remove entire 
newspapers at their own discretion, making the reproduction of the author’s database (and hence 
results) difficult. Finally, Natalini, et al. (2015) evaluated some the drivers of food riots occurred in the 
Middle East, North Africa and Asia regions between 2005 and 2011. The authors found that national 
scarcity of food does not significantly impact the occurrence of food riots, as opposed to international 
food prices, whose relationship with food riots was significant. In particular, the authors found a 
methodologically robust threshold for the FAO FPI over which food riots are more likely to occur. This 
was set at 148 for the deflated version of the index. However, the database of food riots used in that 
study presented geographical and time constraints. The first part of the research presented in the next 
section of this paper hence constitutes a geographic and time update of the paper of the paper of 
Natalini, et al. (2015). 
 
3. An update of the food, price and fragility nexus 
Since the aim of the DGSM was to recreate the dynamics that could lead to an increase in the 
probability of food riots for countries and possibly forecast them, we used the findings from Natalini, et 
al. (2015) to inform this part of the model. In particular, the research found that food riots are more 
likely to occur when the Food and Agriculture Organisations’ Food Price Index (FAO FPI) (FAO, 
2015) went beyond a threshold of 148. However, this research only covered the period 2005 – 2011 
and was limited to countries in Africa, Middle-East and Asia. We thus updated their database of food 
riots to 2013 also including all the areas of the world and reran their econometric tests to find a more 
accurate threshold for the FAO FPI. 
 
Using the definition of food riots presented in the previous section (the same as used by Natalini, et al. 
(2015)), we carried out a simple keyword search to find newspaper articles in English that met the 
definition of food riots. To add more entries to the database we also used the database on food riots 
developed by the Food Price Crisis Observatory from the World Bank (WB, 2015a), assuming that 
their records were correct. The manual search for online media articles was preferred to the use of 
larger, online media repositories because we wish our research to be publicly available, open-access 
and easy to replicate. Data gathered through online repositories is often protected by copyright and 
their use is restricted to academic institutions that hold a valid licence. It is also important to note at 
this stage the limitations of our data collection methodology. Our database is indeed deemed to be 
partially incomplete as our search was only carried out in English and on online newspapers. 
Therefore, local food riots that were not large enough to be reported, or that were only reported in local 
printed newspapers or that were reported in a language different from English, would not have been 
captured in our database. In addition, the use of a strict definition of food riots and a keyword search 
will miss cases of instability and riots where food price inflation plays a role, yet where it is not 
specifically mentioned in media reports. Despite these important limitations, our database still retains 
the largest number of violent food riots recorded amongst the databases reviewed for our analysis (e.g. 
Food Price Crisis Observatory). 
Figure 1 presents the updated database of food riots in the form of a timeline. This data arranged in a 
table is also available in Appendix 1 with references and is graphically displayed alongside the deflated 
version of the FAO FPI in Figure 2. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Timeline with database for food riots. The top part of the figure highlights the periods when the 
FAO FPI was above the threshold, whereas the bottom part of the figure shows countries that 
experienced food riots between 2005 and 2013.  
 
 
Fig. 2 Plot of the frequency of food riots per year (columns) and of the deflated version of the FAO FPI 
(red line) for the period 2005 – 2013. 
 
Using this new set of data we estimated a logistic random effects model on a panel dataset with all the 
countries over the timeframe 2005 – 2013. As found by Natalini, et al. (2015) the maximum likelihood 
estimations resulted in a highly significant positive coefficient for the deflated FAO FPI (Table 1). We 
also recalculated the threshold above which countries start to experience food riots which was 140, 
slightly lower than the one found by the authors, but, due to the larger database we have used in this 
paper, more accurate. More precisely, the 140 threshold represents the deflated FAO FPI value above 
which the probability for a random country to experience a food riot is > 1%.  
 
 Estimate SE t-value p-value 
(Intercept) -11.689 1.785 -6.549 5.79e-11*** 
FAO FPI deflated 0.051 0.011 4.526 6.02e-06*** 
σ 1.524 0.397 3.842 0.000*** 
Log-Likelihood -217.185    
Table 1 Random effects logit regression model estimating the effect of the independent variable ‘FAO 
FPI’ on the variable ‘Food Riots’. Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 ‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ ’. 
 
As pointed out in the previous section, food riots do not depend exclusively on the international price 
of food, but also on other complex dynamics. In particular, Natalini, et al. (2015) found that food riots 
are more likely to happen in countries that are already highly fragile. In that paper the authors tested 
different indices of political fragility and found that the index that performed best at predicting food 
riots was the Political Stability and Absence of Violence from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) developed by the World Bank (WB, 2015c). Once updated, the authors’ database of food riots 
and a more accurate threshold for the FAO FPI found, we reran their Hazard model to verify whether 
the WGI still was a good predictor of food riots in countries. For the purpose of this analysis, countries 
that experienced more than one food riot during the time frame selected have been counted once. The 
periods when the deflated version of the FAO FPI was above the 140 threshold were the following: i) 
August 2007—September 2008 that corresponds to 15 months and 27 food riots (as India experienced 
more than one food riot in the period considered); ii) November 2009 – February 2010 that corresponds 
to 4 months and no food riots; iii) July 2010 – November 2014 (beyond the period considered for this 
analysis, so our analysis only considered July 2010 – December 2013) that corresponds to 42 months 
and 20 food riots. We hence analysed the periods 2007-2008 and 2010-2013 as these were the only 
timeframes when the FAO FPI was above the threshold and food riots occurred. Since the results from 
the Hazard model run on both periods were very similar, here we report only those for the period 2010 
– 2013. Differently from Natalini et al. (2015) we decided to use national data from the first year (i.e. 
2010) rather than data averaged for the two (or more) years, as this is more common practice in the use 
of Hazard models. 
 
In Table 2 we present the results from the second period, which fundamentally confirm those found by 
Natalini, et al. (2015). Whether a country is a net cereals importer or exporter does not seem to 
significantly impact the occurrence of food riots. Conversely, even with a longer period of analysis and 
a larger food riots database the WGI is a good predictor of food riots in countries and hence we used 
this measure to calculate the political fragility of the countries in the DGSM. Figure 3 shows the 
Hazard Ratios for the WGI. 
 
Table 2 Hazard model on the period July 2010 – December 2013 when the deflated version of the FAO 
FPI was above the 140 threshold using whether the countries were net importers/exporters and WGI as 
covariates. 
 
 
Covariates 
Regression 
Coefficient 
Exponentiated 
Coefficient 
Standar
d Error 
(Coef) 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
z p-value 
Importer/exporter -0.321 0.726 0.455 0.455 -0.706 0.48 
WGI 2010 0.943 2.567 0.211 0.190 4.970 6.71e-07*** 
Notes: N = 204; number of events = 20 (8 observations deleted because they were missing); 
concordance = 0.769 (se 0.065); R-squared = 0.099 (max possible = 0.644); likelihood ratio test = 
21.18 on 2 df; p = 2.513e-05; Wald test = 27.67 on 2 df; p = 9.809e-07; score (log rank) test = 24.31 on 
2 df; p = 5.249e-06; robust = 10.62, p = 0.004935; Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 ‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 
0.1 ‘ ’. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Plot of the hazard ratios for WGI, where the hazard ratios are plotted on the y-axis and WGI on 
the x-axis. The shaded areas represent the σ and 2σ probability intervals, respectively. 
 
4. The Dawe Global Security Agent-Based Model 
One of the main characteristics of ABMs is the possibility of simulating a system while including 
interactions between micro (i.e. national, country-level in this case) and macro (i.e. global) levels of 
analysis. This was particularly important to our research as the system recreated in the model is made 
of individual agents (countries) whose decisions (in this case production, consumption and trade of 
food) have international consequences in terms of global availability of cereals and hence international 
prices, which in turn have national consequences in terms of occurrence of national food riots. The 
ABM that we present in this paper is empirically grounded, meaning that all the data fed into the model 
as well as the parameters used have been informed using real data. In particular, we used the updated 
analysis from Natalini, et al. (2015) presented in the previous section of the paper to inform some of 
the key dynamics in the DGSM. In particular, in the DGSM the occurrence of food riots mainly 
depends on the level of the international price of food as estimated by the FAO FPI (i.e. either above or 
below the 140 threshold) and on the political fragility of countries as estimated by the WGI. Also, the 
DGSM was built to give short-term (5 years) predictions. 
 
The DGSM is structured around four main elements: i) characteristics of countries; ii) international 
trade of cereals; iii) international price of food; iv) food riot dynamics. These elements will be 
introduced individually and then we will provide a brief summary of the dynamics as they occur inside 
the DGSM. 
 
4.1 Characteristics of the countries 
In our model each agent represents a country, with 213 countries in total. The model simulation starts 
in 2005 and we used real data available for that year to inform countries’ characteristics. The data that 
has been used to inform the characteristics of the countries come from the Global Resource 
Observatory (GRO) project, which holds a collection of data sourced from trusted open-source 
databases such as the World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations  
and further manipulated by the researchers from the Global Sustainability Institute to improve 
consistency and fill in the gaps. The full database is freely available on the institute’s website (GSI, 
2015). During the period simulated (i.e. the years from 2005 to 2013, which is the latest year for which 
data is available) three new countries were constituted (i.e. Montenegro in 2006; Kosovo in 2008; 
South Sudan in 2011) and these countries are added in the model the year after they have been founded 
using real data for that year. 
 
Projections for consumption and production of cereals for each country have been calculated on real 
data available for the period 2005 – 2013 by fitting polynomial regression trend-lines to the data points 
available. The production and consumption data are therefore smoothed to provide production and 
consumption trends in each country. Therefore, significant production shocks are not present in these 
trends and needed to be added exogenously to the model to recreate real world events where they have 
occurred (e.g. the 2007/2008 production losses). 
 
At the beginning of the simulation, countries were also given cereal stocks using data from the GRO 
database (GSI, 2015). These stocks were replaced at the end of each year with the leftover internal 
availability of cereals for each country. 
 
Countries were also provided with stock-to-use ratios (SURs), which we kept constant throughout the 
simulation. These have been calculated for each country by averaging the ratio between stocks and 
consumption for each year also using data from the GRO database (GSI, 2015). 
 
4.2 International trade of cereals 
The countries in our ABM are embedded in a social network that recreates international trade of 
cereals. Real data have also been used to inform these links and have been sourced by the United 
Nations Comtrade database (UN, 2014). Since the staple that is most traded in the world is wheat, we 
decided to use data for international trade of wheat as a proxy for cereals traded in the world. A further 
enhancement of the model would be to explore the main traded crops (wheat, maize, rice and soybean) 
separately to better model trade links – in particular those within Asia (rice) and those from Latin 
America (soybean). The links created between countries reflect real international food trade exchanges 
based on wheat. The network was initialised on data for 2005 and its subsequent evolution was based 
on the logic of keeping existing links when possible and seeking new ones at random when the supply 
from existing links became insufficient.  
 
The international trade of cereals has arbitrarily been split into two rounds, the first one with countries 
importing what they need to cover their current consumption, and the second one to cover their need of 
restocking (i.e. build up national reserves of cereals). In the first round, following the calculation that 
decides whether countries are net food importers or exporters, the importing countries use their existing 
links to find potential exporting countries to trade with and import 10% of what they need from each of 
them. This is to avoid depletion of a country’s stock by one single country. If their current pool of 
partners cannot meet the importing country’s cereals demand, then they will select a random country 
they don’t already have a link with that still has cereals stocks available and import from it. This 
procedure continues until either the import needs for each country are satisfied or until the exports 
available in the world are finished.  
 
Before the second round of exchanges, countries compute their desired cereal stock by multiplying 
their SUR for their consumption and use their leftover internal availability of cereals to satisfy this. If 
not sufficient, countries will import what they need from the other countries following the same 
procedure as during the first round. This procedure continues until either the restocking needs for each 
country are satisfied or until the exports available in the world are finished. 
 
4.3 International price of food and food riots 
Based on the research from Natalini, et al. (2015) and our updated results we included international 
food price dynamics in the model as two regimes, either above or below the threshold of 140. This 
decision was also due to the aim of the model being not to recreate the perfect formation of the FAO 
FPI, but rather to include as many conditions necessary for the model to reproduce the occurrence of 
food riots in countries as possible. 
 
The model was calibrated using the real series of world food prices, which showed a below-threshold 
level from 2005 to 2007, a first spike above the threshold in 2008, a return of the prices below the 
threshold in 2009, and finally four consecutive years above the threshold from 2010 to 2013. The aim 
of the calibration was to reproduce this series using the model data for global production, consumption 
and stocks of food and real data for international food price regimes (i.e. either above or below the 
threshold). It is worth noting here that the aim of the DGSM was not to investigate and model the 
formation of international prices, rather to model some of the dynamics that lead to the occurrence of 
food riots. Although the presence of an international price for food is essential in the DGSM at its 
current stage of development, the dynamics of price formation are not and have therefore been 
simplified. 
 
For the calibration of international food prices, an Evolutionary Tree (ET) model was fit to the data 
from the model using the ratio between Global Cereals Production and Global Cereals Consumption 
and Global Cereals Stocks as independent variables and the real series of price regimes between 2005 
and 2014 as target variable. The was implemented using the R package evtree (Grubinger, et al., 2014) 
and the results are presented in Figure 4. 
  
Fig. 4 ET model on data from the DGSM using ratio between ‘Global Cereals Production’ and ‘Global 
Cereals Consumption’ and the variable ‘Global Cereals Stock’ as independent variables and the 
variable ‘Price threshold’ as target variable. 
 
The results from the ET perfectly recreate the international price regime for the period considered and 
show intuitive dynamics between the trends in global ratio and stocks for cereals and international 
price regime. In particular, when the ratio between global production and consumption of cereals is 
smaller than 0.996637, the international price of food is above the threshold. For any ratio larger or 
equal to 0.996637, global stocks of cereals become significant and, in particular, when these are 
smaller than 132,529.72 (1000 MT), the price climbs above the threshold, and below otherwise. 
 
4.4 Food riot dynamics 
To translate the findings from Natalini, et al. (2015) and our updated results in a format that could be 
used as dynamics in the ABM and to further test whether the international price of food (as captured by 
the FAO FPI) and the fragility of a country (as estimated by the WGI) are significant variables in 
determining whether a country is more likely to experience a food riot, we used a Regression Tree 
Random Effects Model provided by the R package REEMtree (Sela and Simonoff, 2011). This 
instrument is highly recommended when trying to find patterns or categories in given variables and 
implement the findings in an ABM (Sánchez-Maroño, et al., 2015). We added two new discrete 
variables to our database, one that classifies each record either below or above the 140 price threshold 
and another that divides the countries into four homogenous categories of fragility (i.e. high, medium-
high, medium-low, low) according to their WGI estimate for each year. We then ran the REEMtree 
model using the variable food riots as dependent and the two newly created discrete variables as 
independent to find different combinations of price regime and fragility that lead to different 
probabilities for countries to experience  food riots. The results of the model are presented in Figure 5. 
 
 
Fig. 5 REEM model for FAO FPI threshold and WGI categories. Notes: n = 1904; intercept = 1.08e-04; 
Estimated variance of errors = 0.03; Log likelihood = 789.55. 
 
The model assigns a basic probability of experiencing a food riot (i.e. the intercept) which is the same 
for all the countries (and that, in our case, was very close to zero). In addition the model provides 
probabilities according to different combinations of the values for the independent variables: the 
estimates showed that both variables were significant in determining whether a country will experience 
a food riot or not. In particular, countries with low and medium-low fragility have the same probability 
of experiencing a food riot, whereas countries in the more fragile categories have a different probability 
depending on whether the price is above or below the threshold. The model also assigns to each 
country a unique probability of experiencing a food riot (i.e. the random effects) that can be found in 
Appendix 2. The final probability for each country to experience a food riot is thus the sum of the 
intercept, the probability resulting from the tree combinations of fragility and price and random effects. 
 To implement the findings from this section in the ABM, we needed to provide an estimate for the 
WGI for each country. Since this index is an agglomerate of several different indices and measures 
(WB, 2015b), it could not be recreated endogenously. This is also because the purpose of modelling is 
to better understand one or more dynamics of the real world, often too complex to be comprehended by 
simply observing the system. It is hence essential to isolate the conditions for that dynamic to happen 
and simulate only those. Failing to do so might result in a model that is too complex to understand 
hence defeating the original purpose of modelling itself. For this reason we used the same approach 
used to simulate the production and the consumption of food for each country, simply by fitting trend 
lines to the data points we had available for the WGI estimates for each country for each year over the 
period 1995 – 2013.  
 
4.5 Introducing exogenous production shocks 
As trend lines were used to calculate the production function within the DGSM, we required exogenous 
production shocks to be reintroduced in the model exogenously. These production shocks were derived 
from real world data. In particular, a significant price shock was observed in 2007/08 in global food as 
depicted in Figure 6.  
 
 
Fig. 6 Monthly prices for 2000-2010 for wheat, maize and rice showing significant price shocks in 
2007/08. Prices are normalised so that price for each grain in January 2000 is 1. 
 
Food production around this time was significantly impacted by several factors (Challinor, et al., 
2015). However, two major food production shock events occurred before the price shock of 2007/08 – 
in 2002/03 and 2006. During 2002/03 food stocks globally were at an all-time high. This was mainly 
due to high stock levels in China and the production shock happened to coincide with the time when 
China had decided to strategically reduce its stock levels. Therefore, this food production shock was 
delayed as stocks entered international trade. The impact of the food stock reduction and production 
shocks in 2002/2003 and 2006 (along with political responses to these events) is widely credited with 
causing the food price spikes in 2007/2008 (Headey and Fan, 2010). We therefore took the average 
food production shock in the major food producing countries as our basis for our exogenous shock.  
To calculate the food production shocks in 2002, 2003 and 2006 we first fit best fitted lines per country 
to production data between 2000 and 2013 for the major grains (wheat, maize and rice) (Jones and 
Phillips, 2016). This was done for each of the main country producers of those three grains, which 
represented 75% of global production. These best fit lines were then subtracted from production to 
remove the overall growth in production which characterised the food system. This growth matched the 
increase in demand from changing diets and a growing population. A percentage anomaly per year per 
country was then calculated away from this best fit line by dividing by the production for that country. 
Table 3 shows these country anomalies for each year and the average for the years 2002, 2003 and 
2007. These average production shocks were then taken to create our best estimate of the cumulative 
size of the production shock that caused the food price shock in 2007/08. The sum of these production 
shocks represented an overall global food production shock of 8%.  
 
Table 3 Food production anomaly (percentage of overall production) away from best fit line for the 
three major grains (wheat, maize and rice) between 2000 and 2010 in major food producing countries. 
The average losses per country for the major production shock events (2002, 2003 and 2006) are 
shown in the final column. 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
shock 
Argentina 4 1 -3 -1 0 2 -3 6 -3 -12 5 -3 
Australia 4 6 -10 7 2 5 -11 -9 -1 -1 -1 -5 
Bangladesh 3 0 0 0 -4 -2 -2 -1 1 1 2 -1 
Brazil 0 8 -1 9 -1 -12 -7 1 5 -7 -5 0 
Canada 6 -1 -6 0 2 2 1 -6 3 0 -5 -2 
China  36 13 -1 -40 -13 -10 2 -6 4 -6 -5 -13 
France 3 -4 4 -6 4 1 -1 -4 2 1 1 -1 
Germany  0 1 -1 -3 3 1 -1 -2 3 2 0 -2 
India 18 19 -20 -2 -11 -6 -9 2 4 -16 -7 -10 
Indonesia 4 1 0 -1 -1 -2 -4 -3 -1 2 2 -1 
Pakistan 2 0 -2 -1 -1 1 0 1 -2 1 0 -1 
Russia  -11 4 9 -11 -1 1 -2 5 17 15 -19 -1 
Thailand  0 1 0 1 -1 0 -2 0 -1 -2 0 0 
Ukraine 0 9 7 -11 4 1 -8 -9 6 -3 -8 -4 
USA 14 -13 -46 -1 32 4 -29 39 18 29 4 -25 
Vietnam 1 0 1 0 1 0 -1 -2 0 -1 -1 0 
 
 
4.6 Summary of the dynamics included in the DGSM 
To further clarify the sequence of the processes that countries included in the DGSM go through, we 
provide a brief summary of one run of the simulations. The simulation starts with countries producing 
and consuming cereals, and countries compute whether they are net cereals exporters or importers by 
adding their current production to their stocks from the previous year and then subtracting their own 
current consumption. The leftover cereals available are summed to obtain a global figure of cereal 
availability and national consumptions are also summed to obtain a figure for global cereal 
consumption. According to these global figures and two parameters calculated through the calibration 
of the model, the international price of food is set either above or below the 140 FAO FPI threshold. 
Countries subsequently trade to cover both their leftover consumption and need for stocks of cereals. 
They then calculate their level of political fragility as given by the WGI. According to this estimate,  
the international price of food and to their own probability of experiencing food riots, they will have 
different probabilities of experiencing a food riot that year. At the end of the year, the leftover cereals 
become national stocks that will be carried over to the next year. This process is repeated each year. 
 
4.7 Validation of the DGSM 
Models that aim at producing meaningful predictions for future events need to be validated, also to 
facilitate their replicability (Squazzoni, 2012). As mentioned before, the DGSM is empirically 
grounded, which means that we used real data to generate the characteristics of the countries and we 
informed parameters and relationships with statistical and econometric tests carried out on real data 
from past events. This means that the model is internally validated (Squazzoni, 2012). To further test 
whether the dynamics included in the DGSM were sufficient to recreate the occurrence of food riots we 
analysed the data produced from the model in the period 2005 – 2013 and compared it with the real 
data on food riots presented in Section 2. 
 
In order to validate the DGSM, 100 simulations were run and analysed. Firstly, the simulated 
cumulative probability of food riots to happen in the years below (i.e. 2005 – 2007 and 2009) and 
above (2008 and 2010 – 2013) the 140 FAO FPI threshold were calculated and compared with the real 
cumulative probability during those periods. The simulated probability for the below-threshold period 
was 0.06 whereas the real probability was 0.02. For the above-threshold period, the simulated 
probability was 0.17, whereas the real probability was 0.22. Although the DGSM overestimates 
countries’ probability to experience a food riot when the international price of food is below the 
threshold and underestimates their probability when the price is high, the probabilities are remarkably 
similar when aggregated by price regime.  
 
Figure 7 plots the number of food riots per year as they occurred in reality and as predicted by the 
DGSM, alongside the confidence interval for the simulated results. The 2008 peak plotted in both lines 
is proof that the ABM correctly represents a higher probability of the occurrence of food riots in that 
year, and, although the absolute number of food riots per year is underestimated by the model, the lines 
follow the same pattern. Interestingly, the model failed to fully capture the second peak of food riots 
that occurred in 2011 and tended instead to spread the riots that occurred in 2011 over a four-year 
period also covering 2010, 2012 and 2013.  
 
 
Fig. 7 Number of food riots per year as they were reported and as predicted by the DGSM. The pink 
highlighted area around the red line (model’s results) represents the 95% confidence interval in the 
model’s results. 
 
To further investigate the results from the DGSM, the list of countries with the highest probability of 
food riots throughout the whole period as simulated in the model and the database of food riots 
presented in Section 3 were compared to evaluate the accuracy of the DGSM at predicting which 
countries experienced food riots in the time frame considered. The simulated probabilities ranged 
between 0% and 9% with the lowest probability assigned to Australia and the highest to India. In 
particular, 70% of the countries that fell within the top 10 countries most at risk of experiencing a food 
riot as calculated by the DGSM experienced a food riot. This percentage remains unvaried for the top 
20 countries most at risk and 63% for the top 40. 
The accuracy of the DGSM was investigated further by evaluating the predictions for both year and 
country for each food riot resulting from the ABM simulations. In order to do this, an R (R Core Team, 
2013) script calculating the percentage match between real and simulated food riots was run. The script 
first calculated the overall accuracy of the model (i.e. at predicting both countries that did experience a 
food riot during a given year and countries that did not), the percentage of correctly predicted food riots 
in each country for each year and finally the percentage of false food riots predicted (i.e. food riots 
predicted by the model in a certain country during a given year that did not occur in reality). This was 
done for each of the 100 runs of the DGSM and the average results are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 Summary of the averaged results for the predictions from the 100 runs of the DGSM, where 
Food.all is the overall accuracy of the model at predicting both countries that did and did not 
experience a food riot in reality, Food.true the percentage of correctly predicted food riots in each 
country for each year and Food.false is the percentage of false food riots predicted. 
 
Variables 
Percentages 
predicted 
Food.all 95.13% 
Food.true 6.86% 
Food.false 2.44% 
 
 
 
The validation based on the probabilities per year show that the model captures important dynamics 
that cause food riots at the larger scale, although underestimating the total number of food riots per 
price regime. In addition, the analysis on countries that are predicted to experience a food riot at any 
point during the time frame considered led to remarkably accurate results. However, the validation on 
the DGSM’s predictions for year and country for each food riot show that the model is not fully able to 
capture the specific year during which each country experiences a food riot and can hence be 
improved. It is worth noting here that the DGSM, similarly to any other computer model, is not aimed 
at giving (cannot provide) precise predictions about which country will experience a food riot and 
when, but rather it is aimed at giving an indication about which countries are at risk of social upheavals 
due to multiple factors, amongst which we find a high international price of food and their political 
fragility. Further developments of the model may hence include a broader range of influencing factors 
along with revised internal dynamics to fully capture internal feedback effects. These updates to the 
model will be explored in more detail in the Conclusions Section. 
 
5. Forecasting 2017 food riots 
In order to provide forecasts for the future of food riots, 100 simulations of the DGSM were run and 
the results for food riots for the year 2017 were analysed. This year was selected because it is the first 
year in the future at the time of writing this paper (i.e. March 2016) and, in addition, the ABM was 
built to provide short term forecasts for the 5 – 10 years after the last year used to calibrate the models, 
which in this case was 2013.  
The results from the DGSM for the international price regimes suggest that both food and fuel price are 
likely to be above the threshold in 2017, thus increasing the probability of the occurrence of food and 
fuel riots during this year. However, the predictions for the international price regime need to be taken 
with reservations as mentioned in Section 3.3. 
Out of all the years considered, 2017 had one of the highest probability for a random country to 
experience a food riot, which was around 4% as compared to 1% in 2005 (i.e. the year with the 
simulated lowest probability of food riots) and 3% in 2008 (i.e. the year that registered the largest 
number of food riots in reality). The probabilities of food riots for countries for the year 2017 ranged 
between 0% and 17%, with the highest probability assigned to Turkey. In the top 10 countries most at 
risk we find Turkey, Afghanistan, Cameroon, Congo Democratic Republic, Iran, Lao, Thailand, 
Algeria, Mauritania and Nigeria, with probabilities spanning between 17% and 13%. 30 countries were 
assigned with the lowest probability, amongst these we find Austria, Belgium and Iceland. For a better 
visualisation, the results from the food riots forecast for 2017 from the DGSM are presented in Figure 
8. 
 
 
Fig. 8 Probability of food riots for countries based on the forecast for 2017 from the DGSM. 
 
The countries that top the list with the largest forecast probability of experiencing a food riot in 2017 
differ for their political situation and with regard to their history of food riots. The four main variables 
that define the probability for a country to experience a food riot are: i) the intercept identified by the 
REEMtree model (equal for all countries); ii) whether the FAO FPI is above the threshold (equal for all 
countries); iii) the WGI group of fragility for the country and iv) the country-specific random-effects 
assigned by the REEMtree model based on a country’s history of food riots. The intercept and random-
effects assigned by the REEMtree model are very small, which means that, realistically, the only 
factors having a prominent effect on countries’ probabilities for food riots are the price regime (either 
above or below the 140 threshold) and a country’s WGI group. As mentioned above, to limit the 
complexity at this stage of development of the model, countries’ estimates for the WGI are calculated 
according to the trend lines calculated on data available between 1995 and 2013. The countries that top 
the list of probability of food riots for 2017 all show an increasing trend in the data for the WGI in the 
period considered. Therefore, the trend lines applied to the data result in high WGI estimates for these 
countries in 2017. It is worth reminding at this point that the WGI is an aggregated index of political 
fragility of countries, which summarises the information for several different variables and expert 
opinions, as listed in WB (2015b). Finally, the FAO FPI is forecast to be above the threshold for 2017, 
hence causing the probability of countries with high levels of fragility to increase significantly (see 
Figure 5). These reasons explain the diversity between the countries that top the list of probability of 
food riots for 2017. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Global food security is increasingly becoming a concern for the international policy arena, particularly 
because of the possible consequences of climate-related extreme events that can negatively affect the 
production of food in some key regions of the world. Due to the high interconnectedness of the global 
food system, such production shocks can have negative impacts on international economy and political 
fragility of countries, making this subject worth further investigation using a systemic approach. The 
transmission from production shocks to instability via prices supposedly occurs through national 
subsidies for food prices. Indeed, some authors argue that another main cause of food riots, particularly 
during the 2008 global food crisis, was the effective or prospected removal of food subsidies 
(Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011). The newspaper articles gathered to compile the databases of food and 
fuel riots used in this research often mentioned as one of the causes of the violent protests either the 
effective or threatened removal of food subsidies. Developed, developing and low-income countries 
normally subsidise the prices of food and energy resources to ensure their affordability, especially 
when the prices increase (IMF, 2008; Hendrix, et al., 2009). However, these constitute an onerous 
expenditure when the price of imported goods spikes, especially for poor countries. It is hence credible 
to believe that once the price of food crosses a certain threshold due to either a food production shock 
or a disruption in the international food supply chain, poor countries decide to cut subsidies, causing 
grievances from the populations which can turn into (food) riots. This threshold is set at 140 for the 
deflated, annual version of the FAO FPI, as found in this paper. Our findings also confirm that, as 
previously found by Natalini, et al. (2015), national food security does not significantly impact the 
occurrence of food riots as opposed to international food prices and national political fragility.  
 
In this paper we also present a first attempt to model the complexity of the global food system, 
focussing on global food availability, international trade of cereals, the interaction with international 
price of food and the rise of social conflict, mainly in the form of food riots. We developed an Agent-
Based Model (ABM) called the Dawe Global Security Model (DGSM) to simulate the complex 
dynamics of the system, also providing forecasts for food riots for the year 2017. 
 
The validation of the model shows that the DGSM is able to capture the general conditions that cause 
food riots to occur. In particular, the model results show a good level of accuracy whilst predicting 
probability of riots when the price is above/below the threshold and for countries’ probability of 
experiencing a food riot at any point during the time frame considered. The DGSM forecast an 
international food price regime above the threshold for the year 2017 and identified Turkey, 
Afghanistan, Cameroon, Congo Democratic Republic, Iran, Lao, Thailand, Algeria, Mauritania and 
Nigeria as the countries most at risk of food riots. As highlighted before, the DGSM cannot provide 
precise predictions for which countries will experience a food riot in the future. Its forecasts should be 
used as an indication as to which countries require further attention and more in-depth research on 
critical national fragilities. Indeed, whether a country will experience a food riot depends on a long list 
of different factors, most of which still have to be identified, and on the governments’ responses to 
such criticalities. The model can, however, be used to identify some of these criticalities, such as 
countries’ political fragility, their history of food riots and the international food price regime. 
 
The findings from our quantitative and simulation studies seem to indicate that national food insecurity 
does not directly translate in that country’s higher probability of food riots. Rather, our model 
simulates how national food production shocks (i.e. food insecurity) can result in a spike in the 
international price of food, which in turn can cause food riots in countries far from where the crisis 
originated. This reasoning fits with the increasingly accepted acknowledgment that food security, and, 
more in general, scarcity of natural resources, is not a direct cause of conflict, but rather a stressor or 
catalyst (e.g. Homer-Dixon, 1999; OECD, 2012; Raleigh, et al., 2015). As highlighted by our results 
presented in Section 3, the political fragility of countries is a critical factor in the evaluation of 
countries’ probability for experiencing food riots, which is in line with current literature (e.g. Natalini, 
et al., 2015; Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011). Commenting on our findings in the wider context of the 
2008 global food crisis, the results from our research support the analysis that the crisis was caused by 
multiple stressors and that connected different socio-ecological systems, namely the food, energy and 
finance sectors (Homer-Dixon, et al., 2015). Food insecurity is indeed portrayed by Homer-Dixon, et 
al. (2015) as only one of the several factors that caused the crisis seen in the food socio-ecological 
system in 2008, which was facilitated by the high (and increasing) interconnectivity and 
synchronisation of the system. Synchronous failures are forecast to become more frequent in the future, 
which is why our research on empirical simulation of the food system is more relevant than ever. 
 
This said, further developments are needed to reduce the current underestimation of the total number of 
food riots per year when a shock occurs and improve the prediction accuracy at the country level. The 
validation and analysis of the results from the DGSM suggested several potential directions for further 
research. Firstly, the underestimation of the number of food riots is probably due to the fact that the 
causes of food riots can be several and varied, ranging from a wider economic distress of a country, to 
problems in the internal redistribution of food and also the interaction with other political, social and 
economic situations. However, the statistical predictors for food riots currently included in the model 
are limited to the price of food and the political fragility of countries. To improve the accuracy of the 
model, future versions could disaggregate the category ‘cereals’ in the different main grains and focus 
on diets. This broad category could conceal great variability, as different grains are key staples for 
different countries. Populations may be more or less willing to riot according to what grain is scarce or 
too expensive. In addition, the model currently only includes a threshold on the absolute level of food 
prices, which identifies both years with high and low numbers of food riots. Future versions of the 
model could focus on price variations, which may be able to identify the years with the largest number 
of food riots with more accuracy.  
 
Secondly, as for the prediction of food riots in the correct countries, the model at the moment only 
distinguishes between countries according to four categories of political fragility, which are rather 
wide. The only instrument included in the model that differentiates one country from another in terms 
of probability of food riots is the country-specific random effects estimated by the REEMtree model, 
which have a relatively minor impact on the overall probability of riot due to the low number of violent 
food riots.  
 
A third possibility to improve the model performance is linked to the fact that, in its current version, 
the occurrence of food riots in countries does not have any consequence on other variables. In future 
versions of the model, further consequences of countries that experience food riots could be explored. 
This has been observed in countries such as Syria where rioting, which was one of the causal triggers 
in food protests, escalated into civil war, thereby having significant impact on food production. 
Another possible improvement to the model is to further investigate the causes that led each country to 
experience a food riot, or, more simply, refine how the political fragility is calculated in the model, 
maybe translating it in an endogenous process.  
 
Finally, the model does not currently exploit the ABM capabilities to the fullest. In particular, the 
possibility of creating emergent properties generated by the interaction between the countries and their 
individual decisions is limited by the trend lines that define their production and consumption. In future 
versions of the model, countries could make decisions based on their populations and other social or 
economic variables in terms of consumption and production of food, hence changing the dynamics of 
the model. 
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Appendix 1 Database of food riot updated from Natalini, et al. (2015) 
 
Table 5 Monthly food riots with references for the period 2005 – 2013. Rows in bold are the entries 
added from the authors to the original database from Natalini, et al. (2015). 
 
Country 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Burundi 
April 
(BBC 
News, 
2005) 
 
     
 
Somalia  
June (USA 
TODAY, 
2007) 
May (NBC 
News, 
2008) 
  August 
(Pflanz, 
2011) 
 
 
India  
October 
(Majumda, 
2007) 
August 
(Mukherje
e, et al., 
2008) 
 September 
(WB, 
2015a) 
  
 
Mauritania  
November 
(Mail and 
Guardian, 
2007) 
     
 
Cameroon   
February 
(Healy and 
Munckton, 
2008) 
    
 
Burkina 
Faso 
  
February 
(Healy and 
Munckton, 
2008) 
    
 
Senegal   
February 
(Healy and 
Munckton, 
2008) 
    
 
Ethiopia   
February 
(Healy and 
Munckton, 
2008) 
    
 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
  
April 
(BBC 
News, 
2008b) 
    
 
Haiti   
April 
(Christie, 
et al., 
2008) 
   October 
(Morrison, 
2012) 
 
Yemen   
March 
(Worth, 
2008) 
    
 
Morocco   
February 
(Worth, 
2008) 
    
 
Lebanon   
February 
(Worth, 
2008) 
    
 
Egypt   
April 
(BBC 
News, 
2008a) 
  January  
(Rianovost
i, 2011) 
 
 
Tunisia   
June 
(Schneider, 
2008) 
  January 
(Aburawa, 
2011) 
 
 
Sudan   
August 
(Sanders, 
2008) 
  January 
(McDoom, 
2011) 
 
 
Mozambiq
ue 
  
February 
(Schneider, 
2008) 
 September 
(Mangwiro
, 2010) 
  
 
Algeria   
   January 
(The Daily 
Telegraph, 
2011) 
 
 
Oman   
   February 
(Aljazeera, 
2011) 
 
 
Iraq   
   February 
(Al-Salhy, 
2011) 
 
 
Uganda   
   April 
(Kron, 
2011) 
 
 
Syria   
   September 
(Asian 
Correspon
dent, 2013) 
 
 
Banglades
h 
  
February 
(The 
Times of 
India, 
2008) 
    
 
Guinea   
June 
(Schneider, 
2008) 
    
 
Kenya   
May 
(Schoen, 
2011) 
    
 
Afghanista   April      
n (IRIN 
News, 
2008) 
Chad   
September 
(Scoop, 
2008) 
    
 
Honduras   
April 
(WB, 
2015a) 
    
 
Madagasca
r 
  
April 
(Schneider, 
2008) 
    
 
Peru   
April and 
July 
(Schneider, 
2008) 
    
 
Trinidad 
and 
Tobago 
  
April 
(Schneider, 
2008) 
    
 
Zambia   
May (WB, 
2015a) 
    
 
Zimbabwe   
April 
(Schneider, 
2008) 
    
 
Pakistan   
 September 
(Reese, 
2014) 
August 
(The 
Times Of 
India 
Delhi, 
2010) 
  
 
Malawi   
   January 
(Joy, 2012) 
 
 
Maldives   
   April 
(BBC 
News, 
2011) 
 
 
Argentina   
    December 
(Daily 
Mail UK, 
2012) 
 
Iran   
    October 
(Bozorgme
hr, et al., 
2012) 
 
South 
Africa 
  
    August 
(Technolog
y Review, 
2013) 
 
Colombia   
     August 
(The 
Associated 
Press, 
2013) 
Venezuela   
     September 
(Vega, 
2013) 
 
Appendix 2 Random-effects assigned to each country as estimated by REEMtree 
 
Table 6 Random effects for the countries included in the DGSM. 
 
Country Random-effects 
Afghanistan 1.83E-03 
Albania -5.29E-04 
Algeria 1.83E-03 
American Samoa -5.29E-04 
Andorra -5.29E-04 
Angola -5.53E-04 
Antigua and Barbuda -5.29E-04 
Argentina 3.61E-03 
Armenia -5.29E-04 
Aruba -5.29E-04 
Australia -5.29E-04 
Austria -5.29E-04 
Azerbaijan -9.14E-04 
Bahamas -5.29E-04 
Bahrain -1.54E-03 
Bangladesh 1.83E-03 
Barbados -5.29E-04 
Belarus -5.29E-04 
Belgium -5.29E-04 
Belize -5.29E-04 
Benin -5.29E-04 
Bermuda -5.29E-04 
Bhutan -5.29E-04 
Bolivia -9.14E-04 
Bosnia and Herzegovina -1.20E-03 
Botswana -5.29E-04 
Brazil -5.29E-04 
Brunei Darussalam -5.29E-04 
Bulgaria -5.29E-04 
Burkina Faso 2.60E-03 
Burundi 1.83E-03 
Cambodia -5.29E-04 
Cameroon 2.60E-03 
Canada -5.29E-04 
Cape Verde -5.29E-04 
Cayman Islands -5.29E-04 
Central African Republic -2.31E-03 
Chad 1.83E-03 
Chile -5.29E-04 
China -1.54E-03 
Colombia 1.83E-03 
Comoros -8.90E-04 
Congo Dem. Rep. -2.31E-03 
Congo Rep. -9.14E-04 
Costa Rica -5.29E-04 
Cote d’Ivoire 1.83E-03 
Croatia -5.29E-04 
Cuba -5.29E-04 
Curacao -5.29E-04 
Cyprus -5.29E-04 
Czech Republic -5.29E-04 
Denmark -5.29E-04 
Djibouti -5.53E-04 
Dominica -5.29E-04 
Dominican Republic -5.29E-04 
Ecuador -1.25E-03 
Egypt Arab Rep. 6.36E-03 
El Salvador -5.29E-04 
Equatorial Guinea -5.29E-04 
Eritrea -1.95E-03 
Estonia -5.29E-04 
Ethiopia 1.83E-03 
Faeroe Islands -5.29E-04 
Fiji -5.29E-04 
Finland -5.29E-04 
France -5.29E-04 
French Polynesia -5.29E-04 
Gabon -5.29E-04 
Gambia -5.29E-04 
Georgia -1.95E-03 
Germany -5.29E-04 
Ghana -5.29E-04 
Greece -5.29E-04 
Greenland -5.29E-04 
Grenada -5.29E-04 
Guam -5.29E-04 
Guatemala -1.95E-03 
Guinea 1.83E-03 
Guinea-Bissau -1.54E-03 
Guyana -8.90E-04 
Haiti 5.98E-03 
Honduras 3.23E-03 
Hong Kong SAR -5.29E-04 
Hungary -5.29E-04 
Iceland -5.29E-04 
India 1.01E-02 
Indonesia -2.28E-03 
Iran Islamic Rep. 1.83E-03 
Iraq 1.83E-03 
Ireland -5.29E-04 
Isle of Man -5.29E-04 
Israel -2.31E-03 
Italy -5.29E-04 
Jamaica -5.29E-04 
Japan -5.29E-04 
Jordan -1.23E-03 
Kazakhstan -5.29E-04 
Kenya 1.83E-03 
Kiribati -5.29E-04 
Korea Dem. Rep. -8.66E-04 
Korea Rep. -5.29E-04 
Kosovo -1.67E-03 
Kuwait -5.29E-04 
Kyrgyz Republic -1.95E-03 
Lao PDR -5.29E-04 
Latvia -5.29E-04 
Lebanon 1.83E-03 
Lesotho -5.29E-04 
Liberia -1.30E-03 
Libya -1.54E-03 
Liechtenstein -5.29E-04 
Lithuania -5.29E-04 
Luxembourg -5.29E-04 
Macao SAR -5.29E-04 
Macedonia FYR -9.14E-04 
Madagascar 2.27E-03 
Malawi 3.61E-03 
Malaysia -5.29E-04 
Maldives 3.61E-03 
Mali -1.54E-03 
Malta -5.29E-04 
Marshall Islands -5.29E-04 
Mauritania 2.24E-03 
Mauritius -5.29E-04 
Mexico -1.54E-03 
Micronesia Fed. Sts. -5.29E-04 
Moldova -5.29E-04 
Monaco -5.29E-04 
Mongolia -5.29E-04 
Montenegro -4.15E-04 
Morocco 3.28E-03 
Mozambique 7.75E-03 
Myanmar -2.31E-03 
Namibia -5.29E-04 
Nepal -2.31E-03 
Netherlands -5.29E-04 
New Caledonia -5.29E-04 
New Zealand -5.29E-04 
Nicaragua -5.29E-04 
Niger -1.90E-03 
Nigeria -2.31E-03 
Northern Mariana Islands -5.29E-04 
Norway -5.29E-04 
Oman 3.61E-03 
Pakistan 5.98E-03 
Palau -5.29E-04 
Panama -5.29E-04 
Papua New Guinea -1.92E-03 
Paraguay -1.92E-03 
Peru 2.19E-03 
Philippines -2.31E-03 
Poland -5.29E-04 
Portugal -5.29E-04 
Puerto Rico -5.29E-04 
Qatar -5.29E-04 
Romania -5.29E-04 
Russian Federation -1.95E-03 
Rwanda -5.77E-04 
Samoa -5.29E-04 
San Marino -5.29E-04 
Sao Tome and Principe -5.29E-04 
Saudi Arabia -5.29E-04 
Senegal 3.61E-03 
Serbia -5.53E-04 
Seychelles -5.29E-04 
Sierra Leone -5.29E-04 
Singapore -5.29E-04 
Sint Maarten (Dutch part) -5.29E-04 
Slovak Republic -5.29E-04 
Slovenia -5.29E-04 
Solomon Islands -5.29E-04 
Somalia 1.01E-02 
South Africa 3.61E-03 
South Sudan -8.14E-04 
Spain -5.29E-04 
Sri Lanka -2.31E-03 
St. Kitts and Nevis -5.29E-04 
St. Lucia -5.29E-04 
St. Martin (French part) -5.29E-04 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines -5.29E-04 
Sudan 5.98E-03 
Suriname -5.29E-04 
Swaziland -8.66E-04 
Sweden -5.29E-04 
Switzerland -5.29E-04 
Syrian Arab Republic 2.27E-03 
Tajikistan -1.95E-03 
Tanzania -5.29E-04 
Thailand -2.31E-03 
Timor-Leste -6.01E-04 
Togo -8.90E-04 
Tonga -5.29E-04 
Trinidad and Tobago 3.61E-03 
Tunisia 7.08E-03 
Turkey -1.92E-03 
Turkmenistan -5.29E-04 
Turks and Caicos Islands -5.29E-04 
Tuvalu -5.29E-04 
Uganda 1.83E-03 
Ukraine -8.66E-04 
United Arab Emirates -5.29E-04 
United Kingdom -5.29E-04 
United States -5.29E-04 
Uruguay -5.29E-04 
Uzbekistan -1.97E-03 
Vanuatu -5.29E-04 
Venezuela RB 1.83E-03 
Vietnam -5.29E-04 
Virgin Islands U.S. -5.29E-04 
West Bank and Gaza -2.31E-03 
Yemen Rep. 1.83E-03 
Zambia 3.61E-03 
Zimbabwe 1.83E-03 
 
